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Utopia and the Public Sphere
Timothy Stanley
A
lthough the question of religion did not feature prominently in Jürgen 
Habermas’s early political theory, his more recent work has continuously 
addressed the topic. For instance, in one of the few references to religion 
in his 1962 The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, he noted the 
impact on the churches of the differentiation between the private sphere and 
public authority (Habermas 1989, 11– 12).1 Historic processes of secularization 
ultimately privatized religious institutions and did not require further com-
ment. However, as recently as a 2011 compendium on The Power of Religion 
in the Public Sphere, Habermas reiterated his more recent work on the subject, 
arguing that religious and secular citizens “both are involved in an interaction 
that is constitutive for a democratic process springing from the soil of civil 
society and developing through the informal communication networks of the 
public sphere” (Habermas 2011, 27). This later interest in religion is grounded 
in what one commentator in that same volume cited as the urgent need to inte-
grate religious voices in the workings of public reason in order to avoid social 
disharmony and to thwart potential violence (Calhoun 2011, 127). However, 
this chapter argues that the hermeneutic procedures Habermas develops for the 
public sphere cannot bear the weight that his later understanding of religion 
demands of them.2 Such an insight validates Paul Ricoeur’s earlier argument 
that Habermas’s “depth hermeneutics” (Habermas 1971, 218, 226, 256) were 
themselves utopic in nature. It is from this vantage point that a more productive 
understanding of the public potential of religious discourse can be understood.
1. Habermas’s Public Sphere
Habermas’s Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere traces the develop-
ment of what Hannah Arendt called the rise of the social over the course of 
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the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries in Europe (Habermas 1989, xi). Key to 
this history is the differentiation between the private realm of family and com-
modity exchange and the public authority of state police and the legal court. 
As market economies of commodity exchange expanded, so too did the need to 
protect trade routes and marketplaces. Public authority met this need through 
military and political force. From this process was born the modern nation- 
state (Habermas 1989, 17ff.). The result was a distanciation from the owners 
within the private market and the state that protected it.3 Through this pro-
cess, Habermas discerns the extrication of a public social sphere that operated 
between private autonomy and state authority. The key to this mediation is to 
note the way the private sphere gains public relevance, and here Habermas cites 
Hannah Arendt’s understanding of the rise of the social (Habermas 1989, 19; 
Arendt 1958, 46). He argues that over time, the capital and power base in the 
marketplace allowed for art, music, and other cultural products such as news 
agencies to flourish (Habermas 1989, 20). The newsagents began to critique 
and interpret good or bad art as both informative and representative of private 
taste and interest. Habermas cites the coffee house as a paradigmatic example 
of the critical consciousness that emerged in this sphere. Citizens met at coffee 
houses, salons, and private clubs to discuss the various socioeconomic issues 
that were now being published in journals and newspapers (Habermas 1989, 
33). This conglomeration of property- owning, educated private citizens— the 
bourgeois— led to a public sphere where the opinions of private individuals 
were formed and propagated.
The public sphere thus arises directly from the communication networks 
that developed in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Moreover, it bears a tremendous burden in Habermas’s account of democratic 
legitimacy. For instance, in a discussion of public opinion in constitutional 
law, he contrasts the mass sways of public mood with a reasoned deliberation 
of publicly engaged citizens. Citing Siegfried Landshut’s 1957 essay “Volks-
souveränität und öffentliche Meinung” (Sovereignty of the People and Public 
Opinion), he notes that
the modern state presupposes as the principle of its own truth the sovereignty 
of the people, and this in turn is supposed to be public opinion. Without this 
attribution, without the substitution of public opinion as the origin of all author-
ity for decisions binding the whole, modern democracy lacks the substance of its 
own truth. (Landshut 1953, 586; cited in Habermas 1989, 238)
The constitutional requirement of public opinion for democratic legitimacy 
made it necessary to find ways of relating private autonomy to state author-
ity without compromising either. It is in this sense that Habermas focuses on 
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the distanciation of the public sphere as a principle of democratic legitimacy.4 
Democracy is thus not understood simply as private interests (Locke) nor pri-
vate autonomy (Mill). Habermas’s aim is “the public use of reason (Kant)” 
(Habermas 2001a, 110; cf. Habermas 1998, 239– 52), where private citizens 
can debate, form public opinion, and legitimate democratic authority. Haber-
mas’s public sphere is thus utterly opposed to the erosion of public deliberation 
in mass media with communication processes driven by political domination 
(Habermas 1989, 241, 249).
Habermas’s public sphere is therefore a proposed cure to the coercive com-
municative practices of mass society. In order to ensure the autonomy of private 
individuals and legitimate democratic authority, he envisions a sphere of pub-
lic debate whereby individuals congregate to argue out their ideas (Habermas 
2001a, 110). As Habermas reflects on changes in twentieth- century democratic 
culture, he recognizes that there cannot be a return to a simple bourgeois domi-
nance, with its various contradictions. Although he claims that its ideals may 
have been open to all, it remained exclusionary, as feminists and African Ameri-
cans, among other marginalized groups, have pointed out (Fraser 1992). As 
such, Habermas envisions a more pluralist and diverse public sphere (Habermas 
2004, 5– 18), and it is precisely here that the communicative processes, which 
underwrite his account of the public sphere, face an increased burden. The 
reason is that he doesn’t accept that these diverse groups have the necessary 
means to sort out differences among themselves. In his words, “The solidarity- 
generating energies of these fabrics of life do not directly carry over into demo-
cratic procedures for the settling of competing interests and power claims on 
the political level” (Habermas 1992a, 444). These groups are sources of solidar-
ity that form their own worldviews, values, and traditions, but their modes of 
communication must avoid coercion in the public sphere. It is precisely here 
that religion provides a chief example as the “pacemaker” for the coherency of 
his proposal, a point I will return to later (Habermas 2004, 12).
Much of Habermas’s subsequent work on the public sphere focuses on 
justifying and further articulating the manner in which private interests can 
be understood in terms of communicative practices (Habermas 1992b, 468). 
Although different communities do not have the tools within themselves to 
resolve conflicts between rival communities, Habermas argues that they can be 
understood to have within themselves the communicative procedures neces-
sary to do so. On the one hand, there is a need for public procedures through 
which disagreements can be argued and resolved. For the legal force of the 
state’s rational procedures to have democratic legitimacy, however, they must 
be agreed on by critically informed public opinions. To resolve this dilemma, 
Habermas’s philosophy must demonstrate the interrelation between the state’s 
rational procedures of argumentation and the communicative nature of all 
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private interest groups. What is at stake is the communicative possibility of 
a public that is genuinely representative of private interests, such as those of 
particular religious groups.
2. Habermas’s Hermeneutics of Human Interests
Habermas’s conception of the communicative nature of the public sphere is 
grounded in his critique of ideology’s coercive power. Implicit to his account 
of the ideological problem is a critique of Marx. In The German Ideology, Marx 
analoged ideology to a camera obscura— a device that depicts images upside 
down. The ideology obscures or distorts. As Marx wrote, “If in all ideology 
men and their circumstances appear upside- down as in a camera obscura, this 
phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life- process as the inver-
sion of objects on the retina does from their physical life- process” (Marx 1970, 
42). Habermas’s contention, however, is that concealed in this analogy is the 
problem of understanding historical life processes. In Knowledge and Human 
Interests, Habermas claims that Marx threw “together interaction and work 
under the label of social practice (Praxis).” This confusion resulted in “the idea 
of a science of man” that was obscured “by identification with natural science” 
(Habermas 1971, 62). This same confusion can be seen in the way Marx dis-
tinguished between relations of production and forces of production, which, 
on the one hand, led to an objectivist emphasis in the forces of production 
and, on the other, concealed the structure of symbolic action and the role of 
cultural tradition in the relations of production. We could layer this again with 
an emphasis on the infrastructure as the base for the ideological superstruc-
tures that distort the social reality. However, Habermas contends that these 
distinctions again conceal the manner in which ideology is at work precisely 
in the relations and in the superstructure. Habermas returns to Hegel’s earlier 
emphasis on self- reflection and the struggle for recognition in his Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit. For instance, in the master– slave dialectic (Hegel 1977, 111ff.), 
the relation conceals the recognition between the two parties. This is not sim-
ply a matter of power but rather a breakdown in dialogue. As Habermas puts 
it, “The suppression and renewal of the dialogue situation are reconstructed 
as a moral relation. The grammatical relations of communication, once dis-
torted by force, exert force themselves” (Habermas 1971, 58). Hence Habermas 
demands a more pervasive critique of ideology, which might ensure noncoercive 
discourse. Ideological critique cannot rely on natural science as its basis, because 
technically exploitable knowledge is not exhaustive of the ideological problem. 
Seeing things as they really are demands not only a natural scientific account of 
reality— it also requires a human scientific one. As Habermas concludes at one 
point, “The knowing subject must also direct the critique of ideology at itself ” 
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(Habermas 1971, 61). Hence, for Habermas, “social theory . . . is only possible 
as the self- reflection of the knowing subject” (Habermas 1971, 62– 63).
It is in this light that Habermas’s ideal public sphere can be understood. It 
is a sphere of “communication free from domination” (Habermas 1971, 53). 
Marx’s distinction between forces and relations of production, between infra- 
and superstructures, concealed the way ideological domination was at work in 
the communicative relations of production. The public sphere therefore must 
include a critique of the ways communicative action itself promotes certain 
interests over others, excluding some voices at the expense of others. Further-
more, this more self- reflective critique of ideology is put to use in considering 
the publicization of private interests in a public sphere of critical debate. As 
already noted, he is tied to a diverse public sphere, which must now work to 
overcome differences in a way that would not allow rival groups to coerce or 
dominate. The tension is most acute in the case of religion, which, continuing 
Marx’s critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, provides the foundation for all 
other ideological critique. The key, however, is to develop a mode of publiciza-
tion of private interests that does not completely undermine the communica-
tive basis of private groups as such.
To accomplish this task, Habermas turns to Freudian psychoanalysis and 
what he refers to as “depth hermeneutics.” In an addendum to the English 
translation of Knowledge and Human Interests, which was his 1965 Inaugural 
Address to the Frankfurt Chair, he makes a three- part delineation between 
the instrumental sciences, historico- hermeneutic sciences, and finally critical 
social sciences. The middle, hermeneutic science acknowledges the rise of philo-
sophical hermeneutics after Hans- Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method (1988). 
Habermas maintains that his own third social- science approach critiques and 
overcomes the coercive potential of rival traditions in a way that hermeneutics 
alone did not. In order to provide a critical account of the intersubjective and 
reflective nature of communication, Habermas turns to Freudian psychoanaly-
sis. Freud provides the way beyond instrumental sciences while maintaining a 
depth of critique necessary to overcome coercive communicative practice. As 
Habermas puts it,
The derivation of the structural model from experiences of the analytic situation 
links the three categories ego, id and super- ego to the specific meaning of a form 
of communication into which physician and patient enter with the aim of setting 
in motion a process of enlightenment and bringing the patient to self- reflection. 
(Habermas 1971, 244)
It is this form of self- reflection where distortions can be interrogated. The inte-
rior tensions can be articulated— transferred into a discourse the physician and 
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patient can explain. What was once a pathological state of self- deception can 
be “superseded” and, most important, “reconciliation with excommunication” 
can occur (Habermas 1971, 244). Thus the therapist brings into recognizable 
discourse the private pathological distortion.
In the sixth chapter on the “Dream- work” in the Traumdeutung, Freud 
himself noted how “the dream- content seems like a transcript of the dream- 
thoughts into another mode of expression, whose characters and syntactic laws 
it is our business to discover by comparing the original and the translation” 
(Freud 2010, 295). The structural analysis of this transference of the dream into 
the therapeutic narrative provides the explanatory phase, which in turn leads to 
enlightenment. This explanatory model thus uncovers or, more to the point, 
publicizes the repression (Verdrängung) of the dream. Thus the exclusion “from 
public communication,” the excommunication of the “private language” in the 
dream, must be uncovered (Habermas 1971, 224). It is this conflict between 
public and private that psychoanalysis can resolve. Freud’s Durcharbeitung, this 
“working- through,” “designates a dynamic component of cognitive activity that 
leads to recognition only against resistances” (Habermas 1971, 231). Thus, as 
Habermas writes, “what is unconscious is what is removed from public commu-
nication. Insofar as it expresses itself in symbols or actions anyway, it manifests 
itself as a symptom, that is a mutilation and distortion of the text of everyday 
habitual language games” (Habermas 1971, 238). Habermas’s approach to pub-
lic communication, then, is modeled on a structural analysis of the transference 
of private language into public discourse. The translation, however, is not sim-
ply a matter of correcting distortions between common languages but rather 
liberation from systemic distortions.
3. Habermas on Public Religious Discourse
Habermas maintains the model of translation in his contemporary understand-
ing of the publicity of private interest concerns. As he suggests, their interaction 
must be driven by a “world- wide, civilizing power of formation,” and “mutual 
recognition” (Habermas 2001b) should be the content of that power. However, 
more than any other interest, religious discourse in particular has tested Haber-
mas’s theory. As recently as his essay in The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere 
mentioned previously, he argues that “religious citizens who regard themselves as 
loyal members of constitutional democracy must accept the translation proviso 
as the price to be paid for the neutrality of the state authority toward compet-
ing worldviews” (Habermas 2011, 26). Religious and secular citizens thus must 
continually work toward domination- free recognition of each other’s viewpoints. 
However, it is precisely here that religious language poses the greatest danger. 
In an essay responding to theological engagement with his work, Habermas 
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contrasted theological transcendence with his alternative transcendence from 
within and “methodical atheism” (Habermas 1992c, 235). Here again Habermas 
draws on Hegel’s methodology5 in order to go beyond him. In this case, Haber-
mas argues that Hegel’s philosophy of religion failed to claim the same basis of 
experience as the theological does with the religious tradition that it describes.6 
It is important to emphasize again at this point how Habermas’s recent affirma-
tion of the publicity of religious traditions is rooted in his reliance on strong 
forms of solidarity, adequate to the task of legitimizing democratic authority. To 
do so, interest groups such as religious communities must be able to articulate 
their concerns in their own voice. Habermas proposes his atheistic method as a 
means of maintaining communicative fellowship with that religious tradition in 
a way that doesn’t lose sight of religious belief and language altogether (Haber-
mas 1992c, 235). As he puts it,
We are exposed to the movement of a transcendence from within . . . In this 
way we become aware of the limits of that transcendence from within which is 
directed to this world. But this does not enable us to ascertain the countermove-
ment of a compensating transcendence from beyond. (Habermas 1992c, 238)
In this way, Habermas associates such accounts of transcendence with private 
pathology. His atheistic transcendence from within thus attempts to apprehend 
religious language at the interpersonal level and maintains the hermeneutic 
framework of translation. He justifies this in light of his method’s linguistic 
nature, which is able to capture a common communicative coincidence with 
the religious tradition’s own language about itself. This same approach is echoed 
in debates Habermas held with the then cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (Habermas 
et al. 2006). As Habermas argues at that point, because religious membership 
differentiates itself from the societal citizen, “the universalist legal order and 
the egalitarian societal morality must be inherently connected to the fellowship 
ethos in such a way that one consistently proceeds from the other” (Habermas 
et al. 2006, 49). As such, he seems to concede the importance of Christian 
religion to Ratzinger but only in so far as religious language can inform a non-
religious political discourse.7 Habermas’s positive statements about religion and 
Christianity in general should be tempered by the nuance of his hermeneutics. 
He concedes postsecularism in a more pluralist society, but this is not a recanta-
tion of his concerns about the pathologies of religious transcendence.
This best explains why Habermas consistently cites religious tolerance as 
the pacemaker for cultural rights, as he did in an essay by that title. It is pre-
cisely because religious groups maintain values that go beyond the secular order 
that they develop antirationalist discourse. This applies to not only religious 
violence but a range of ethical norms, such as those concerning gender and 
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marriage rights (Habermas 2004, 13). He therefore argues that religious com-
munities must develop the normative principles of the secular order within 
themselves (Habermas 2004, 12). Religious groups are called to work out how 
to internalize the normative values of rational communicative procedures. 
Habermas recognizes that these procedures will inevitably be enforced by the 
democratic authority, even if only as a last resort. Habermas’s recent remarks 
upon the acceptance of the 2005 Kyoto Prize also bear this out. He consis-
tently qualifies his positive statements about the public expression of religious 
discourse by explicitly calling for translation to a secular mode (Rowe 2005). 
Again returning to The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, he promotes the 
ideal of a “reflexive consciousness” such that a religious group “makes the egali-
tarian premises of the morality of human rights compatible with its own articles 
of faith” (Habermas 2011, 26 and 27). Religious communities internalize the 
wider values in a way that eases and facilitates the translation, but this raises a 
serious question about the degree and manner in which such translation and 
interrelation can occur. It is precisely for these reasons that a return to Ricoeur’s 
earlier critique of the utopic nature of Habermas’s hermeneutics is justified.
4. Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics of Utopia
In his Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, Ricoeur draws particular attention to the 
way Habermas distinguishes between hermeneutic and critical social sciences. He 
agrees with Habermas’s own aim to surpass instrumental sciences and the various 
ways in which “modern ideology may be defined as the reduction of all other 
interests to this interest” (Ricoeur 1986, 234). Implied here is Habermas’s cri-
tique of the systematic social sciences of economics and sociology as well. How-
ever, Habermas refuses Hans Georg- Gadamer’s emphasis on tradition and the 
enlightenment prejudice against prejudice itself in Truth and Method.8 Herme-
neutics may provide nomological knowledge but not the ideological critique 
at the level of communicative action that Habermas claims is necessary for the 
public sphere (Habermas 1971, 310). Rather, as Ricoeur points out, Habermas’s 
critical social sciences “draw a line between cases where theoretical statements 
grasp the real human situation and the cases where the laws developed describe 
in actuality the situation of reification” (Ricoeur 1986, 235). In Habermas’s 
view, hermeneutics of coercive language at the level of superstructural relations 
of production doesn’t “dismantle the system of distortion” (Ricoeur 1986, 236). 
However, Ricoeur contends with Habermas’s critique of hermeneutics in three 
ways. First, he maintains that hermeneutics going back to Dilthey and Schlei-
ermacher includes an explanatory and critical element. Furthermore, he points 
out that even in Habermas’s critical social science, the hermeneutic dimension 
remains, as “depth hermeneutics” (Ricoeur 1986, 236). Hence, while he agrees 
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with Habermas that “distortions belong to the sphere of communicative action,” 
he rejects the opposition with Gadamer, because he does not “see how we can 
have a critique without also having an experience of communication” (Ricoeur 
1986, 236– 37). Ricoeur focuses on this more basic experience of communica-
tion in his own account of the integrative function of ideology.
However, Ricoeur’s critique of Habermas is ultimately aimed at his psycho-
analytic model of overcoming private interests through public self- reflection. 
Ricoeur emphases this point precisely in order to demonstrate the utopic ele-
ment in Habermas’s account of the public sphere (Ricoeur 1986, 244). Cru-
cially, Habermas never maps the patient– physician relation onto the public 
situation. Ricoeur’s contention is that this oversight belies a much more signifi-
cant problem with the analogy between psychoanalysis and public discourse. 
First, the thinker in the sphere of critical social sciences “does not transcend the 
polemic situation” (Ricoeur 1986, 247). There is no patient and no physician 
in this regard. Second, there is no transference in ideology critique, where the 
original scene is transposed onto the physician– patient dialogue in miniature 
(Ricoeur 1986, 248). The critical moment cannot claim such a space nor cre-
ate one in the physician’s model. Third, recognition is not intrinsic to ideology 
critique. As Ricoeur argues, “Ideology critique is a part of a process of struggle 
and not one of recognition” (Ricoeur 1986, 249). Citing Althusser in Lenin and 
Philosophy, such a point of recognition is not possible until there is a classless 
society. This last point is where Ricoeur circles the utopic element in Habermas. 
The free and unfettered communication is not a realized situation. It remains 
unfulfilled, an illusion, in the positive and rational sense Freud gives this term. 
And here, Habermas himself admits the need for fantasy. As he says in Knowl-
edge and Human Interests,
The “good” is neither a convention nor an essence, but rather the result of fan-
tasy. But it must be fantasized so exactly that it corresponds to and articulates a 
fundamental interest. The interest in that measure of emancipation that histori-
cally is objectively possible in our given and manipulable conditions. (Habermas 
1971, 288)
Ricoeur points out that utopia appears only at this point toward the end of 
Habermas’s Knowledge and Human Interests. Habermas has only extended this 
emphasis when noting the “ideal speech situation” and “communicative com-
petence” with which this emancipatory imagination can be articulated and take 
hold as rational hope (Habermas 1971, 288). Hence, while Ricoeur agrees with 
Habermas’s critique of Marx and his emphasis on the ideological sphere of com-
municative action, he nonetheless demonstrates that the resultant space of cri-
tique in Habermas’s thought is, in the end, utopian.
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Ricoeur accepts that this sphere of noncoercive and liberating communication 
between various actors is a noble aim. However, this is not to say that Habermas’s 
nonideological communication, with its physician paternalism, provides a work-
able set of procedures to achieve that aim. Ricoeur’s critique of Habermas focuses 
on the hermeneutic procedures, which depends on a more nuanced account of 
ideology itself. Ricoeur therefore discerns three levels of ideology. With Marx, 
already noted by Habermas, the first distortive level of ideology is identified. As 
Ricoeur puts it, “Marx depends on a model put forth by Feuerbach, who had 
described and discussed religion precisely as an inverted reflection of reality” 
(Ricoeur 1986, 4). Ricoeur finds Habermas helpful to understand the ideologies 
at work within social relations. However, Ricoeur appropriates this critique of 
Marx in a more rich account of the symbolic nature of ideology itself. As such, 
Ricoeur focuses on two further levels of ideology: legitimation and symboliza-
tion. Following Clifford Geertz’s analysis in his essay “Ideology as a Cultural 
System,” Ricoeur finds a supporting theory of cultural symbolism. After Geertz, 
ideological theory is brought into dialogue with the contention that “action in its 
most elementary forms is already mediated and articulated by symbolic systems. 
If this is the case, the explanation of action has to be itself mediated by an inter-
pretation of its ruling symbols” (Ricoeur 1991, 316). Symbols have a constitu-
tive function in ideology, as they are the basic building blocks that allow people 
to read and interpret cultural action. It is in this sense that Ricoeur contends that 
the critique of ideology must already function within a hermeneutic framework. 
Ideology is already at work in the process of recognition (Ricoeur 1991, 316). 
As Ricoeur argues, “Only because the structure of human social life is already 
symbolic can it be distorted” (Ricoeur 1991, 316). This symbolic level makes 
it possible to properly construe “the import of ideological assertions” (Ricoeur 
1986, 257).9
In Ricoeur’s own engagement with psychoanalysis in Freud and Philosophy, 
he recognizes that the goal of interpretation is always to expose the idols and 
embrace the symbols (Ricoeur 1970, 27).10 As one commentator put it, “Thus 
we must maintain a hermeneutics of suspicion which unmasks human wish- 
fulfillments and shatters idols, and [also] the hermeneutics of retrieval which 
listens to symbols and to symbolic narrative discourse” (Thiselton 1992, 372). 
In Interpretation Theory, Ricoeur summarized the manner in which symbols 
take on meaning in metaphor.11 For Ricoeur, what enlightens symbol is meta-
phor, and what enlightens metaphor is symbol (Ricoeur 1976, 54): “On one 
side, there is more in the metaphor than in the symbol; on the other side, there 
is more in the symbol than in the metaphor” (Ricoeur 1976, 68). Hence sym-
bolic experience is accessible only through linguistic and literary expressions 
that ultimately intertwine (Ricoeur 1976, 65). While symbols dictate the way 
in which metaphoric structures are put together, the metaphor supersedes the 
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symbol “in the sense that it brings to language the implicit semantics of sym-
bol. What remains confused in the symbol . . . is clarified in the tension of the 
metaphorical utterance” (Ricoeur 1976, 69). Symbols are not metaphorical in 
and of themselves; rather, Ricoeur argues that metaphors become metaphorical 
in the tension that occurs between a literal interpretation and a figurative one:
The metaphorical interpretation presupposes a literal interpretation which self- 
destructs in a significant contradiction. It is this process of self- destruction or 
transformation which imposes a sort of twist on the words, an extension of mean-
ing thanks to which we can make sense where a literal interpretation would be 
literally nonsensical. (Ricoeur 1976, 50)
So the literal interpretation leads to a contradiction and crisis that must be 
resolved by a figurative or metaphorical interpretation. For example, “When 
Shakespeare speaks of time as a beggar, he teaches us to see time . . . to see time 
like a beggar” (Ricoeur 1976, 51). These two disparate symbols are brought 
together to show a resemblance. This resemblance is the key to the metaphori-
cal utterance and what creates a new relationship. Thus “real metaphors are 
not translatable . . . A metaphor in short, tells us something new about reality” 
(Ricoeur 1976, 52– 53). It is in this sense that Ricoeur’s hermeneutic account of 
symbolic interactions in metaphor includes an inherent openness to new pos-
sibilities and alternative meaning.
Ricoeur’s account of metaphor provides the context through which to 
understand his claims about the mediating level of ideological legitimation and 
its relation to systems of power.12 Legitimation stands between and often leads 
to the ideological distortion of the symbolically mediated social reality.13 Ideol-
ogy can therefore fluctuate between levels of distortion and social constitution. 
In one case, ideology distorts individual subjects’ relationship to reality, and in 
the other, it constitutes it in a necessary and meaningful way. Legitimation pro-
cesses are dangerous, because they are influenced by power structures that can 
disregard the symbolic mediation in favor of their own purposes. For instance, 
a power structure may coerce people to relate to the conditions of production 
in a way that suits it rather than a way that remains meaningful for people’s 
daily lives. However, by differentiating these three levels of ideology, Ricoeur is 
able to account for its ability to both distort and integrate societies: “At its three 
levels— distortion, legitimation, symbolization— ideology has one fundamental 
function: to pattern, to consolidate, to provide order to the course of action” 
(Ricoeur 1991, 318). It functions as a means of reproducing the relations of 
production, and it has a preserving function of stabilizing cultures.
However, if, for Ricoeur, ideology is an inescapable feature of social rela-
tions, its symbolic nature includes the possibility of critical progress toward free 
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communicative action. In this sense, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics after Habermas 
depends on the notion of utopia:
What we must assume is that the judgment on ideology is always the judgment 
from a utopia. This is my conviction: the only way to get out of the circularity in 
which ideologies engulf us is to assume a utopia, declare it, and judge an ideology 
on this basis. (Ricoeur 1986, 172– 73)
A dialectic emerges in Ricoeur’s thought at this point. Ideologies function in 
light of and in connection with utopia. Utopia stands beyond ideology as its 
counterpart. Ricoeur picks up on the nature of this utopic “outside” from the 
word itself as developed in Thomas More: “a place which exists in no real place, a 
ghost city; a river with no water; a prince with no people, and so on . . . From this 
‘no place’ an exterior glance is cast on our reality, which suddenly looks strange” 
(Ricoeur 1986, 16). This is not to say that any fanciful story can function as a 
utopia. In his lecture on Mannheim’s criteriology of utopias, he states that they 
are situationally transcendent and, crucially, that “a utopia is fundamentally real-
izable . . . a utopia shatters a given order; and it is only when it starts shattering 
order that it is a utopia” (Ricoeur 1986, 273). This utopic “shattering” is crucial 
to the way Ricoeur links ideology and utopia. If ideology has an integrative 
symbolic function, its deepest distortion occurs in its stasis. Ideologies tend to 
look back to legitimate social elites. Utopias tend to look forward and typically 
arise from lower social groups. As Ernst Bloch also recognized in his Thomas 
Münzer als Theologe der Revolution (1921 [1960]), it was Münzer, not Thomas 
More, who is the best exemplar in this regard, where a chiliastic or messianic 
moment is realized in history. As Riceour would comment, such moments mark 
“a transcendent point of departure for a social revolution” (Ricoeur 1986, 276). 
There are other types of utopias that Ricoeur cites, following Mannheim: lib-
eral humanitarian, conservative, and socialist- communist. However, the point 
of each is to project a future goal of society that might shatter, reorient, and 
refigure its ideology. These goals and future orientations would drive ideology in 
a dialectical manner (Ricoeur 1986, 289). As Ricoeur puts it,
We must try to cure the illnesses of utopia by what is wholesome in ideology— by 
its element of identity, which is once more a fundamental function of life— and 
try to cure the rigidity, the petrification, of ideologies by the utopian element. 
(Ricoeur 1986, 313)
Such a dialectic, however, must not circle in on itself. Rather, the utopic, 
precisely insofar as it projects and motivates a shift toward the future, fosters 
progress.
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5. Religious Discourse in the Public Sphere
Ricoeur claims, in the end, that Habermas’s own project is better understood as 
a utopia, a vantage point from which ideological symbols can be understood 
as idols of distortion and oppression. As one commentator writes,
We may summarize Ricoeur’s two criticisms of Habermas as follows: first, the 
critical theorist cannot and does not stand outside or above the social process. 
Second, the only possibility for judgment is one that contrasts ideology to utopia, 
for it is only on the basis of a utopia— the point of an ideal— that we can engage 
in critique. (Taylor 1986, xix)
Utopia thus stretches the scope of public imagination precisely at the sites of her-
meneutic contest. Such a contest cannot be coordinated in a paternalistic model 
of pathological translation. Rather, as Ricoeur argues in an essay on “The Task 
of the Political Educator,” the challenge is to develop new categories and con-
tribute to the social imaginary as a vital contribution to social change.14 Here, 
he reiterates the importance of thinking “utopia in the social order” (Ricoeur 
1975, 289) and draws particular attention to Claude Lévi- Strauss’s explanation 
in Tristes Tropiques for why the tools of the colonizer were not employed by the 
local civilizations: “There was no category to apprehend them” (Ricoeur 1975, 
279).15 This is the necessary context to understand his conclusion in his Lectures 
on Ideology and Utopia: “Hermeneutics without a project of liberation is blind, 
but a project of emancipation without historical experience is empty” (Ricoeur 
1986, 237). Liberation demands new utopic categories that contribute to the 
social imaginary in order to impact historical change (Ricoeur 1975, 290). Ide-
ology critique thus demands not an ideology- free zone of public communica-
tion but rather a more basic sense of the hermeneutic procedures necessary to 
distinguish between distortive idols and integrative symbols.
By returning to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of utopia in this way, it becomes 
possible to see that the challenge of religious discourse in the public sphere 
is not a matter of integrating religious voices into the workings of public 
reason. Rather, the challenge is to produce and maintain hermeneutic pro-
cedures for a public capable of coordinating a utopic vision of liberation, of 
which Habermas’s own notion of the public sphere is a prominent example. 
Although Habermas’s account of the secular public helpfully directs attention 
to the communicative procedures necessary for reasoned debate and demo-
cratic legitimacy, the persistent and new visibilities of religion in public surpass 
the model of excommunication. Moreover, a redoubling of the privatization 
of religious discourse, as Jacques Derrida suggested, will not suffice.16 Rather, 
my contention is that what is needed is a more thoroughgoing account of 
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the utopic capacity of public symbols, for which religious symbols are some 
of the most ambiguous and powerful. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of utopia pro-
vides the framework for such an account precisely because he maintained a 
more broad and open understanding of publication processes of distanciation: 
“For Ricoeur, the ‘hermeneutical function of distanciation’ consists in the 
autonomy which a written text receives at the moment when its author releases 
it onto the public” (Jeanrond 1994, 71). Public works thus stand in their own 
autonomy, ready for new appropriations. There is therefore no point at which 
the private sphere can be clarified of its pathologies as such— no Freudian 
scene of transference beyond this hermeneutic process of publication. Such 
a hermeneutic accepts that there will be public texts that produce disruptive 
interactions. Ricoeur demonstrates how to embrace this process as part and 
parcel to the very way symbols function. This utopic element has the capacity 
to shatter our present ideologies at the point at which religious symbols have 
turned to idols.
6. Postscript
The case of Islamic notions such as Sharia has become almost inextricably linked 
to ideological concerns in the public sphere. For instance, on February 7, 2008, 
Rowan Williams delivered the foundation lecture in the Temple Festival series 
at the Royal Courts of Justice on “Civil and Religious Law in England: A Reli-
gious Perspective.” His discussion of the “rights of religious groups in a secular 
state” focused particularly on the case of Sharia or Islamic law. Early sections of 
the lecture cited public anxieties about the place of Muslims in British society 
and noted public opinion polls that indicated that what most people think 
they know about Sharia “is that it is repressive towards women and wedded to 
archaic physical punishments.” In brief, it is understood to be “a pre- modern 
system in which human rights have no role” (Williams 2008b). In an attempt to 
indicate reasoned discourse, Williams went on to note the degree to which this 
public perception had effected debate of this issue among Muslim intellectuals. 
In Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, Tariq Ramadan writes,
In the West the idea of Sharia calls up all the darkest images of Islam . . . It has 
reached the extent that many Muslim intellectuals do not dare even to refer to the 
concept for fear of frightening people or arousing suspicion of all their work by 
the mere mention of the word. (Ramadan 2004, 31)
Despite these qualifications, the news media response to the speech was of 
almost total condemnation. At one point, The Guardian posted a photo of Wil-
liams with a crazed look in his eye, laughing in full clerical garb (Butt 2008). 
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It is a recent example, although others could be cited (Benedict XVI 2006), 
where even reasonable public conversation on Sharia results in incommuni-
cable debacle. The result is that as “secular” societies become more diversely 
multireligious, the strategy to integrate religious citizens into the public order 
of reasonable conversation and debate results in further social exclusion. The 
secular program of translation and excommunication rules out certain words 
like Sharia from the start. Even reasoned scholars of Islam refrain from using 
the term, and one of the more reasonable and moderate Christian figures in 
Europe was publicly chastised for doing so. As it stands, public discussion of 
Sharia is excommunicated when linked to reasoned discussion of religious and 
secular law. However, after Ricoeur, such public texts could be understood in a 
utopic way with political educators working to expand the public imagination.17 
Ricoeur’s model expects significant contradictions and the manner in which the 
symbol’s literal meaning explodes. But it is precisely here that the idolized sense 
is shattered and new meaning becomes possible. In this way, the utopic vision of 
an alternative sense of moderate civil society might be conceptualized.
Notes
 1. For more on this transition, see Meyer (1995, 372).
 2. A number of contemporary commentators have called for a rethinking and 
expansion of public hermeneutic procedures. For instance, in an essay on 
“Secularism, Faith and Freedom,” the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan 
Williams, contrasted programmatic to procedural secularism. The former case 
assumes “that any religious or ideological system demanding a bearing in the 
public is aiming to seize control of the political realm and to override and nullify 
opposing convictions” (Williams 2008a, 47). However, in a way akin to Ricoeur, 
Williams suggests that the procedures of public discourse be understood such 
that they are capable of coordinating ideological positions. Although not forth-
coming in the specifics of such procedures, Williams was not naïve to the chal-
lenges his proposal posed for the realities of religious differences today. In the 
case of Islamic thought, he noted, “One of the questions that Christians will 
want to pursue in their continuing dialogue with Islam is whether the idea of a 
‘secular’ level of citizenship with all that this implies about liberties of conscience 
is indeed compatible with a basically Islamic commitment in the shape of society 
at large” (Williams 2008a, 54). However, his emphasis is clearly on the need to 
promote democratic activism and echoes Jeffrey Stout’s similar claim that “demo-
cratic reform may indeed be achievable by democratic means in places where 
the majority of the citizens are religiously active if citizens are prepared to build 
coalitions of the right sort” (Stout 2008, 543). In the end, these commentators 
draw attention to the need to develop constructive hermeneutics, though with-
out providing it in their essays.
 3. One of the reasons for this was the state’s growing taxation of the tradesmen. 
The state could not protect trade routes without waging taxes. This led to the 
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publication of government— that is, political institutions paid for by taxed 
money were considered public. The system of taxation was thus a key instigat-
ing factor in the formation of a distinction between the private citizens and the 
public authorities. Thus the private realm of conjugal family, and the commodity 
exchange that supported it, generated the funds necessary to pay for the nation- 
state in the sphere of public authority. The realm of public authority secured the 
marketplace, which in turn protected the economic conditions for the private 
realm of the family to flourish. For further discussion of the reflexive relationship 
between the realm of pure humanity, commodity exchange, and the sphere of 
authority, see Habermas (1989, 46).
 4. This notion of distanciation will be important for Ricoeur’s contribution 
explored later.
 5. In Hegel’s lectures on Philosophy of Religion, the death of God in Christ rep-
resents a moment within God’s own self- revelation and self- understanding in 
which there is a renunciation of the natural and finite. The Christian God sub-
lates (Aufgehoben) or is elevated beyond, which allows God to transcend the finite 
and become the consummation of all religious concretizations. “It is a passing 
over of finite things, from the things of the world or from the finitude of con-
sciousness . . . to the infinite, to this infinite being more precisely defined as 
God” (Hegel 1984, 414).
 6. This is a point he made in more detail in terms of “detranscendentalization” 
(Habermas 1999, 130).
 7. This can be seen in the way Habermas hangs on to the importance of translating 
religious language into public political language. Habermas resists the use of the 
term secular and even refers to a postsecular context, but he maintains the way 
religious language should be translated into something else— public discourse, 
broadly put. In any case, he believes that secular and religious people alike must 
take each other seriously, in language that is not necessarily religious, and that 
terms such as the likeness to God should be faithfully translated into the equal 
dignity of all humans (Habermas et al. 2006, 45ff.). This approach feeds back 
into his theories of rational argumentation, which he has defended on numer-
ous occasions, including a contemporary discussion to the Ratzinger debate on 
religious tolerance.
 8. Crucial to this concern was Gadamer’s emphasis on a horizon of understand-
ing, which included a person’s effective history. Rather than a barrier to the 
text, he demonstrated how a person’s history could function as a bridge: “A per-
son who has an horizon knows the relative significance of everything within 
his horizon, whether it is near or far, great or small. Similarly, working out the 
hermeneutical situation means acquiring the right horizon of inquiry for the 
questions evoked by the encounter with tradition” (Gadamer 1988, 302). As 
one commentator puts it, “The event of understanding . . . is the formation of 
a comprehensive horizon in which the limited horizons of text and interpreter 
are fused into a common view of the subject matter— the meaning— with which 
both are concerned” (Linge 1977, xix). “Prior understanding influences us in 
unpredictable and essentially uncontrollable ways. Through it, history affects 
and indeed effects consciousness; and consciousness so determined Gadamer 
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calls ‘effective- historical consciousness’ . . . in brief, we are, more than we know” 
(Weinsheimer and Gadamer 1985, 13).
 9. Ricoeur cites Geertz (1973, 209) at this point. For Geertz’s comment on meta-
phor, cf. Geertz (1973, 259).
 10. Ricoeur’s own self- understanding of Freud and Philosophy was that Freud had 
helped him enlarge hermeneutics “beyond a mere semantic analysis of double- 
meaning expressions” (Ricoeur 1977, 318).
 11. This book helpfully summarized his reflection in The Rule of Metaphor where 
Ricoeur worked through Aristotle’s account of metaphor at the intersection of 
rhetoric and poetics and recovered his definition of metaphor as “giving the thing 
a name that belongs to something else” (Ricoeur 1977, 19). Cf. Aristotle (1995, 
1457b). Although some modern theorists interpreted this as a “deviation” that 
implied a substitution theory of metaphor, Ricoeur argues that this is misleading. 
It is not a simple substitution but rather the sense of productive interaction that 
is important. “The modern authors who say that to make a metaphor is to see 
two things in one are faithful to this feature” (Ricoeur 1977, 24).
 12. Geertz also cited this connection insofar as he agreed that “ideology is always 
about power” (Ricoeur 1986, 259). In Geertz’s words, “It is through the con-
struction of ideologies, systematic images of social order, that man makes himself 
for better or worse a political animal” (Geertz 1973, 218).
 13. Ricoeur depends on Weber and Habermas for many of his ideas on legitimacy. 
As he remarks at one point, “Weber’s analysis of the legitimation of authority 
reveals a third, mediating role for ideology. The legitimation function of ideol-
ogy is the connecting link between the Marxist concept of ideology as distortion 
and the integrative concept of ideology found in Geertz” (Ricoeur 1986, 14).
 14. One wonders about the autobiographical nature of this essay. For instance, in an 
Espirit interview, Ricoeur acknowledged the gap between his political life and his 
own contributions to political theory (Ricoeur 1981).
 15. He went on to cite a similar example in Greek society, “which was able to develop 
an industry based on the invention of the techniques of geometry and nascent 
physics. But this industry was never systematically developed because the project 
of saving human labor in an epoch of slavery did not itself constitute a positive 
value” (Ricoeur 1975, 279– 80; cf. Strauss 1974).
 16. For instance, in the essay “Above All, No Journalists!” he addressed the religious 
scene of Abraham’s violence on Mount Moriah (Derrida 2001, 56ff.). Derrida com-
mended the journalistic silence of Abraham in a way that left open the possibility of 
a purely private concern. Such was Habermas’s response to Derrida in another place, 
which suggested that he had confused rhetoric for philosophical reason (Habermas 
2006, 14ff.). See also Derrida’s 2004 interview, which suggests a “messianicity with-
out messianism . . . in a sense faith without religion of some sort” (Derrida 2006, 
268– 69). For a brief summary of Derrida’s critique of Habermas, see Lasse Thomas-
sen’s introduction to the The Derrida- Habermas Reader (2006, 6– 7).
 17. It is in this sense that it is possible to understand why Ricoeur addresses his 
lecture on the political educator not to party militants or disengaged citizens 
but to “intellectuals who are looking for ways they can honestly exercise effective 
action” (Ricoeur 1975, 271).
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